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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, policymakers, academic commentators,
consumer advocates, civil liberties groups, and user communities have
expressed grave concerns about the steadily increasing levels of
enforcement of intellectual property rights.' Many of these concerns relate
to the "alphabet soup" of transborder intellectual property enforcement,
which consists of the following: SECURE (Standards to Be Employed by
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and Knowledge Governance" Conference at Bucerius Law School in Germany, and on
the "The Future of Global Intellectual Property Protection" Panel at the University of
West Indies in Barbados. The Author is grateful to Suhayb Ahmed for his invitation to
contribute to the inaugural issue of the Drake Law Review Discourse. He would like to
thank Dana Beldiman, Patricia Judd, and Molly Land for their kind invitations and
hospitality; the participants of these events for their valuable comments and
suggestions; and Linzey Erickson, Erica Liabo, and Lindsey Purdy for excellent
research and editorial assistance. Part II of this Essay draws on research from the
Author's earlier article in the SMU Law Review.
1. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64
SMU L. REV. 975 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Six Secret Fears]; Susan K. Sell, The Global
IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of
Play (lQsensato, Occasional Paper No. 1, 2008), available at http://www.iqsensato.org
/pdf/Sell IP EnforcementState of Play-OPs 1 June_2008.pdf.
June 2012] Transborder Intellectual Property Enforcement
Customs for Uniform Rights Enforcement), 2 IMPACT (International
Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce),3  ACTA (Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement),4 TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement),' COICA (Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits
Act), 6 PIPA (Protect IP Act), 7 SOPA (Stop Online Piracy Act),8 and
OPEN (Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act).9
Although I have discussed the various concerns raised by the highly
controversial ACTA ° and the increasingly intrusive digital copyright
2. For discussions of the non-binding SECURE at the World Customs
Organization, see generally Li Xuan, WCO SECURE: Legal and Economic
Assessments of the TRIPS-plus-plus IP Enforcement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 62 (Li Xuan & Carlos M. Correa eds.,
2009) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT]; Henrique Choer
Moraes, Dealing with Forum Shopping: Some Lessons from the SECURE Negotiations
at the World Customs Organization, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT,
supra, at 159; Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 465, 539-40 (2009).
3. See Kaitlin Mara, Hope for Consensus on WHO and Counterfeits Moves
to May Assembly, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Jan. 27, 2009, 10:33 AM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2009/01/27/hope-for-consensus-on-who-and-counterfeits-moves-to-may-
assembly/ (discussing the controversy surrounding the creation of IMPACT at the
World Health Organization).
4. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011,
50 I.L.M. 243 (2011) [hereinafter ACTA].
5. See Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited May 13, 2012) (providing up-to-date information
about the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations); see also Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The
Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 27 (2011) (discussing TPP).
6. Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act, S. 3804, 111th
Cong. (2010).
7. Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of
Intellectual Property Act of 2011 (PIPA), S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011); see generally
Letter from John R. Allison, Professor, Univ. of Tex. at Austin, et al. to Members of
the U.S. Cong. (July 5, 2011), available at http://cdt.org/files/pdfs/SOPAHouse-letter
-with PROTECT IP letter FINAL.pdf (arguing against the adoption of the
PROTECT-IP Act). In the interest of full disclosure, the Author has signed onto this
letter.
8. Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
9. Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act, H.R. 3782,
112th Cong. (2012).
10. For discussions of ACTA, see generally Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its
Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Complex Politics]; Peter K. Yu,
Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA (forthcoming 2012)
[hereinafter Yu, What Enforcement?]; Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 1.
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enforcement agenda," I have yet to explore what a combination of these
initiatives would mean for U.S. individuals, technology developers, and
small and mid-sized firms. This Essay picks up that task by exploring
whether-and if so, why-these entities should be concerned about this
half-cooked alphabet soup.
Part II of this Essay identifies six different concerns and challenges
ACTA poses to U.S. consumers, technology developers, and small and
mid-sized firms. Part III explores the ongoing negotiation of TPP.
Although the secretive and dynamic nature of the TPP negotiations has
prevented this Essay from providing a detailed analysis of the emerging
agreement, 12 this Part explains why TPP is likely to be more dangerous
than ACTA from a public interest standpoint. Part IV concludes by
highlighting the challenges recently created by SOPA and PIPA-two
pieces of legislation that are as problematic as, if not more problematic
than, ACTA and TPP.
II. ACTA
The negotiation of ACTA began in June 2008 and concluded close to
three years later, following eleven rounds of negotiations in different parts
of the world. 3 The Agreement aims at setting a higher benchmark for
international intellectual property enforcement for the United States,
Japan, members of the European Union, Switzerland, and other like-
minded countries. 14 As Susan Schwab, the former United States Trade
Representative (USTR), formally announced:
[T]he goal [of the Agreement] is to set a new, higher benchmark for
enforcement that countries can join on a voluntary basis.... The
envisioned ACTA will include commitments in three areas: (1)
11. See generally Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal
Transplants in Hong Kong, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693, 701-19 (2010) (critiquing
the heightened enforcement measures introduced through the digital copyright reform
in Hong Kong); Yu, What Enforcement?, supra note 10 (discussing the efforts to
address crossborder, digital, and transborder enforcement challenges).
12. See Mike Masnick, USTR Claims TPP Has 'Unprecedented'
Transparency, but It Won't Reveal the Details Unless You're a Big Industry Lobbyist,
TECHDIRT (Feb. 20, 2012, 7:40 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120218
/0 1452217800/ustr-claims-tpp-has-unprecedented-transparency-it-wont-reveal-details-
unless-youre-big-industry-lobbyist.shtml (reporting the transparency problems
concerning the TPP negotiations).
13. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 1, at 985-86.
14. See id. at 984-85.
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strengthening international cooperation, (2) improving enforcement
practices, and (3) providing a strong legal framework for [intellectual
property rights] enforcement. 5
Although the Agreement was ambitious in scope-with proposals
calling for the introduction of the graduated response system, 6 the notice-
and-take-down mechanism, 7 and criminal liability for all forms of
intellectual property infringements8-the final text, which some
commentators have referred to as "ACTA Lite," contains much more
moderate provisions. 9  Instead of elevating the intellectual property
standards of both the European Union and the United States, ACTA
merely provides the lowest common denominator of standards found in
these two trading powers.20 To alleviate intrusion on fundamental rights
and to provide flexibility, the Agreement also includes some safeguard
clauses 2' and numerous optional provisions. 22
From a public interest standpoint, ACTA, therefore, may not be as
dangerous as many initially claimed, at least with respect to a developed
country like the United States. 23 After all, many of the Agreement's
15. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador
Schwab Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement to Fight Fakes (Oct. 23,
2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-announces-us-will-seek-
new-trade-agreement-fight-fakes.
16. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 1, at 1055-57. The graduated
response system enables Internet service providers to take a wide variety of actions
after giving users warnings about their potentially illegal online activities. These
actions include suspension or termination of service, capping of bandwidth, and
blocking of sites, portals, and protocols. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Graduated
Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373 (2010) (providing an in-depth analysis of the graduated
response system).
17. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 1, at 1029.
18. See id. at 1086.
19. See Monika Ermert, Treaty Negotiators Turn to "ACTA Lite" in Hopes of
Closure, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 8, 2010, 4:39 AM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2010
/09/08/treaty-negotiators-turn-to- %e2%80%9cacta-lite % e2% 80% 9d-in-hopes-of-
closure/.
20. See id.
21. See, e.g., ACTA, supra note 4, arts. 27.2-.4.
22. The most revealing example is footnote 2 of the Agreement, which
stipulates that "[a] Party may exclude patents and protection of undisclosed
information from the scope of [the section on civil enforcement]." Id. § 2 n.2.
23. It is important to note that ACTA can remain quite problematic in other
countries, including those that are currently not parties to the Agreement. See Yu, Six
Secret Fears, supra note 1, at 1028-44 (discussing how ACTA could lead to greater
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provisions can already be found in both existing U.S. legislation and the
free trade agreements the country has signed with its trading partners. 24
The Obama Administration has also taken the position that ACTA is a
congressional-executive agreement. 25 By virtue of this designation, the
Administration need not seek Senate approval for the Agreement or
introduce implementing legislation.2 1
Nevertheless, ACTA, once ratified, will pose six different challenges
to U.S. consumers, technology developers, and small and mid-sized firms.
First, although the USTR claims ACTA will not modify U.S. laws, 27
modification could still take place in the form of changes in common law
interpretation of existing laws and changing emphases on how laws are to
be enforced. 28 Down the road, the administration could also use ACTA as
a justification for statutory revision, leading to what commentators have
described as "policy laundering" and "backdoor lawmaking. '29
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in developing countries).
24. See id. at 1017.
25. See Letter from Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, to
Ron Wyden, U.S. Senate (Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://infojustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/84365507-State-Department-Response-to-Wyden-on-ACTA
.pdf (providing the State Department's clarification on ACTA's treaty status). For
discussions of the complications raised by the ACTA's legal status, see generally Sean
Flynn, ACTA's Constitutional Problem: The Treaty Is Not a Treaty, 26 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 903 (2011); Oona A. Hathaway & Amy Kapczynski, Going It Alone: The Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement as a Sole Executive Agreement, ASIL INSIGHTS, Aug.
24, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insightl10824.pdf; Jack
Goldsmith & Lawrence Lessig, Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement Raises Constitutional
Concerns, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
/article/2010/03/25/AR2010032502403.html.
26. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 1, at 1022.
27. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TRADE FACTS: ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) 4 (2008), available at http://www.ustr
.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2008/asset-upload file760_15084.pdf ("[O]nly
the U.S. Congress can change U.S. law.").
28. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 1, at 1044-45.
29. For discussions of "policy laundering" and "backdoor lawmaking," see
generally id. at 1024-28; Peter K. Yu, The Political Economy of Data Protection, 84
CHI-KENT L. REV. 777, 786-89 (2010). As two commentators have defined:
"Policy laundering" is a term that describes efforts by policy actors to have
policy initiatives seen as exogenously determined, or even seen as
requirements imposed by powerful others. The United States and the
United Kingdom are identified as policy actors that routinely push for the
establishment of regulatory standards in international policy venues so
that domestic policies can be brought into line with those policies "under
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Second, ACTA will affect those Americans who travel outside the
country to visit, study, or work. It will also affect U.S. firms conducting
business abroad. While the Agreement does not explicitly require border
guards to search iPods, DVD players, laptops, or other electronic devices,
it gives them the authority to order the seizure, confiscation, or destruction
of suspected counterfeit or pirated goods." Countries that are eager to
please the U.S. government or attract foreign investors, therefore, may be
tempted to provide more stringent protection than what is currently found
within the United States.3
In countries with unappealing records on corruption and limited
protection of human rights and civil liberties, giving Customs more
discretion is highly disturbing. 2 Equally disconcerting is the potential
challenge small and mid-sized firms will face when Customs lock up their
legitimate goods in faraway places.33
Consider, for example, the confiscation of low-cost manufactured
goods that look similar to their branded counterparts, but are in fact cheap
products that are safe, legitimate, and widely consumed by Americans.
Consider also the seizure of generic medicines that religious charities or
not-for-profit organizations bring into poor countries to help the sick and
needy. Once these legitimate goods are confiscated, the costs to secure
their release are likely to be quite high. In many cases, such as those
concerning essential medicines, the delay in securing such release could be
more than a simple inconvenience. 4 The procedures required by a foreign
court or a government agency could also be highly cumbersome, not to
mention the potential lack of safeguards found in the U.S. Constitution.35
Third, ACTA will lock in some of the legal standards built into the
the requirement of harmonization and the guise of multilateralism."
Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Catch 1201: A Legislative History and Content
Analysis of the DMCA Exemption Proceedings, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 121,
128 (2006).
30. ACTA, supra note 4, art. 25.
31. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 1, at 1047.
32. See id. at 1048.
33. See id. at 1047.
34. For discussions of ACTA's impact on access to medicines, see generally
SEAN FLYNN & BIJAN MADHANI, ACTA AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 3 (2011),
available at http://rfc.act-on-acta.eu/access-to-medicines; Brook K. Baker, ACTA-
Risks of Third-Party Enforcement for Access to Medicines, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 579
(2011).
35. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 1, at 1049.
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existing intellectual property system.3 6 These lock-in standards, in turn,
could privilege business models that rely heavily on strong intellectual
property protection. For example, ACTA requires member states to offer
protection against both the circumvention of technological measures used
to protect copyrighted works37 and the removal of copyright management
information.38  ACTA further requires these members to tighten
regulations over Internet service providers39 while creating new penalties
for "aiding and abetting" intellectual property infringements. 4°  By
adopting standards embraced by incumbent industries, ACTA may "harm
small and mid-sized enterprises and innovative start-ups."'4'
In addition, the Agreement may "reduce consumer access to
innovative products or services from abroad," including those from Japan
and South Korea.42 Because the Internet is global by nature, changes in
ACTA members could also affect the information U.S. users will be able to
obtain. 43 In fact, "if firms are eager to develop a transnational policy that
will satisfy the laws and policies of all the major markets, the more
restrictive laws and policies other countries have, the more these laws will
eventually dictate the type of policy to which U.S. internet users are
subject. '44
Fourth, by locking in the existing high protection and enforcement
standards, ACTA may foreclose the opportunity for Congress to revise
laws in the near future. 45 While Congress can always ratchet up intellectual
property standards beyond what ACTA requires, the Agreement may
prevent Congress from ratcheting down those standards. ACTA,
therefore, may prevent countries from experimenting with new regulatory
and economic policies at a time when the Internet and new
communications technologies have created many new opportunities. 46
Fifth, ACTA will undermine the longstanding interests of the United
36. See id. at 1045.
37. ACTA, supra note 4, arts. 27.5, .6.
38. Id. art. 27.7.
39. Id. art. 27.
40. Id. art. 23.4.
41. Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 1, at 1045 (footnote omitted).
42. Id. at 1045-46.
43. See id. at 1046.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 1066-70.
46. See id. at 1037.
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States in promoting human rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law
throughout the world. 47 Unless explicit safeguards are included in the
Agreement to protect free speech, free press, and privacy, there is a very
good chance that ACTA will provide a pretext for other countries to
tighten information control.48 Even worse, ACTA would "make it difficult
for the United States to complain about those highly intrusive foreign laws
that are introduced in the name of implementing ACTA or complying with
its higher enforcement standards. '49
Finally, in negotiating ACTA, the USTR has wasted considerable
time, energy, and resources on developing a highly ineffective plurilateral
agreement. 0 The resulting agreement not only excludes countries that
constitute the major sources of piracy and counterfeiting, such as China,
Paraguay, Russia, and Ukraine," but it also fails to remedy the many
enforcement-related defects5 2 in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). 3 Worse still, by using
a "country club" approach to international norm-setting, ACTA takes
away the opportunity to strengthen enforcement norms in current
multilateral regimes-whether under the World Trade Organization or the
World Intellectual Property Organization.14
On April 15, 2011, ACTA was finally adopted, after more than five
years of planning, pre-negotiations, negotiations, and debates.5 5 A few
months later, eight countries-Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New
Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and the United States-signed the
47. See id. at 1050-59.
48. See id. at 1050.
49. Id. at 1059.
50. See id. at 1083-93.
51. See id. at 1089.
52. See Yu, What Enforcement?, supra note 10; see also Peter K. Yu, TRIPS
and Its Achilles' Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 483-504 (2011) (examining why the
TRIPS Agreement fails to provide effective global enforcement of intellectual property
rights).
53. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994).
54. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 1, at 1080.
55. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Opening for Signature) (May 1, 2011), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2011/5/0501Ol.html; see also Yu, Six Secret
Fears, supra note 1, at 980-98 (providing a brief history of ACTA).
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Agreement in a ceremony in Japan. 6 Thus far, Mexico, Switzerland, and
five members of the European Union (Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, the
Netherlands, and Slovakia) have refrained from signing the Agreement. 7
Because ACTA will not enter into force until six countries have deposited
their instruments of ratification,58 it remains interesting to see if and when
the Agreement will enter into force.
III. TPP
While the Obama Administration was actively completing the ACTA
negotiations, it also began the TPP negotiations with Australia, Brunei
Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and
Vietnam. 9 It is anticipated that TPP will include an intellectual property
chapter, similar to those intellectual property chapters found in existing
U.S. free trade agreements. 60 As the USTR stated in his recent update on
the TPP negotiations:
TPP countries have agreed to reinforce and develop existing [TRIPS]
rights and obligations to ensure an effective and balanced approach to
intellectual property rights among the TPP countries. Proposals are
under discussion on many forms of intellectual property, including
trademarks, geographical indications, copyright and related rights,
patents, trade secrets, data required for the approval of certain
regulated products, as well as intellectual property enforcement and
genetic resources and traditional knowledge. TPP countries have
agreed to reflect in the text a shared commitment to the Doha
56. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Joint Press
Statement of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Negotiating Parties (Oct. 1,
2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011
/october/joint-press-statement-anti-counterfeiting-trade-ag.
57. Press Release, Gov't Commc'ns Unit (Fin.), Time Out for Finland in
Ratifying ACTA (Mar. 9, 2012), available at http://valtioneuvosto.fi/ajankohtaista
/tiedotteet/tiedote/fi.jsp?oid=352766.
58. ACTA, supra note 4, art. 40.1.
59. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Outlines of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011
/november/outlines-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement (last visited May 13, 2012)
[hereinafter TPP Outlines].
60. See generally SEAN FLYNN ET AL., PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS OF THE
U.S. TPP PROPOSAL FOR AN IP CHAPTER (2011), available at http://infojustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/TPP-Analysis-12062011.pdf (providing a recent analysis of the
leaked U.S. proposal for TPP's intellectual property chapter).
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Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health.61
When the TPP negotiations were first announced, one could not help
but wonder whether such negotiations would call for development of
intellectual property protection and enforcement standards that go beyond
those aspired to by the ACTA negotiators. Indeed, many commentators
have described TPP as "ACTA-plus." 62 Although it is hard to predict
which provisions the final text will eventually adopt, it is not difficult to
explain why TPP could become more dangerous than ACTA from a public
interest standpoint. There are at least five reasons.
First, unlike in the ACTA negotiations, the United States has more
political and economic leverage over the other parties in the TPP
negotiations. Although the ACTA negotiations brought together two
major intellectual property powers-the European Union and the United
States-the continuous disagreements between these two powers resulted
in the adoption of a more moderate agreement. 6  As Kimberlee
Weatherall points out, ACTA tells us as much about the disagreement
between the negotiating parties as it does about what higher standards
these countries wanted to adopt.64
For example, the United States wanted to have stronger mandates
concerning digital enforcement; yet, the European Union was not ready to
agree to provisions that had yet to be harmonized within the Union, such
as the graduated response system and safe harbors for online service
providers. 65 Similarly, although the European Union pushed hard for the
inclusion of criminal liability for all forms of intellectual property rights
(including most notably geographical indications), the United States was
reluctant to provide such broad coverage. 66 In fact, many U.S. companies
expressed concern over the potential criminal liability for trademark and
61. TPP Outlines, supra note 59.
62. See, e.g., Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum
Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 464 (2011).
63. See Yu, Complex Politics, supra note 10, at 11.
64. See Kimberlee Weatherall, ACTA as a New Kind of International IP
Lawmaking, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 839, 841-42 (2011).
65. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 1, at 1055-57.
66. See Monika Ermert, European Commission on ACTA: TRIPS Is Floor
Not Ceiling, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 22, 2009, 7:18 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org
/2009/04/22/european-commission-on-acta-trips-is-floor-not-ceiling/ (quoting Luc
Devigne, the European Union's lead ACTA negotiator, as stating "all IP rights are
equal").
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patent infringement, as opposed to mere piracy and counterfeiting. 67
Compared with the ACTA negotiations, the dynamics of the TPP
negotiations are rather different. Without the European Union at the
negotiation table, the United States is able to rely more on its sheer
economic and geopolitical strengths to push for provisions that are in the
interest of its intellectual property industries. From increased enforcement
in the digital environment to greater protection of pharmaceutical
products, TPP is likely to track more closely to the high U.S. standards of
intellectual property protection than the compromised provisions in
ACTA. In fact, if the United States needs to make compromises, those
compromises are likely to be found in other trade-related areas, not in the
intellectual property area.
Second, the United States has more and better items to offer to
trading partners in the TPP negotiations. Unlike ACTA, which focuses
narrowly on intellectual property protection and enforcement, the TPP
negotiations are trade-based and have a much broader scope.68 Because
the negotiations involve more cross-cutting issues, the U.S. negotiators will
be able to offer "carrots" that they otherwise could not provide during the
ACTA negotiations.69
For instance, New Zealand may find it beneficial to make greater
concessions in the intellectual property area if the United States is willing
to allow for more exports in lamb, wool, and other sheep products. Indeed,
compared with ACTA, TPP is likely to provide a fairer bargain among the
negotiating parties. Although the usual disparity in bargaining power
remains, the availability of other trade items could facilitate constructive
bargaining among the participants, including even those with limited
resources and bargaining chips.
67. The Intellectual Property Owners Association, for example, sent a
strongly worded letter to the USTR, asking for a limitation on the scope of the treaty's
coverage of counterfeiting. See Monika Ermert, U.S. Rightsholders Seek Narrower
Scope of ACTA, Clarity on Trademark Infringement vs. Counterfeiting, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH (July 10, 2010, 11:09 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/07/10/us-
rightsholders-seek-narrower-scope-of-acta-clarity-on-trademark-infringement-vs-
counterfeiting. This letter is available at http://ipo.informz.net/z
/cjUucD9taT04NTk2MTQmcD0xJnU9NzUxNzUyMzYwJmxpPTMOMzg4OTM/index.
html.
68. See TPP Outlines, supra note 59 (outlining the key trade and trade-
related areas covered by TPP).
69. See Yu, Complex Politics, supra note 10, at 8-9 (criticizing ACTA for not
offering any carrots).
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From the standpoint of protecting due process, free speech, and other
civil liberties, however, TPP is likely to be more dangerous. Because of the
different value negotiating parties place on trade and trade-related items,
some parties may be willing to concede more on intellectual property
protection and enforcement in exchange for greater benefits in other trade
or trade-related areas. TPP, therefore, could include more stringent
obligations in the intellectual property area.
Third, although the ACTA negotiations already concluded, the TPP
negotiations are still in progress.70  Being later in time, the latter
negotiations may incorporate matters that did not have much traction
during the ACTA negotiations. The TPP negotiators could also revive
proposals that were rejected by the ACTA negotiators, especially the EU
delegates. More importantly, should new issues arise, the TPP negotiators
will be able to include those new items in the negotiations.
Fourth, although both ACTA and TPP have raised similar concerns
about transparency and accountability, 7' these concerns are somewhat
different. While it is hard to support the categorical nondisclosure of draft
treaty texts, especially with respect to proposals advanced solely by the
U.S. government,72 it is more acceptable to refrain from disclosing
complicated and sensitive information, such as tariffs, quotas, and financial
data. 73 Thus, the USTR may have a stronger justification for refusing to
70. The twelfth round of TPP negotiations completed only recently in Dallas,
Texas on May 8-18, 2012. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Talks Advance in Texas (May 16, 2012), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2012/may/trans-pacific-
partnership-tpp-talks-advance-texas. The next round of the negotiations will be held in
San Diego two months later. Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 5.
71. For criticisms of the transparency and accountability problems
surrounding ACTA and TPP, see generally David S. Levine, Bring in the Nerds:
Secrecy, National Security and the Creation of International Intellectual Property Law,
30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105 (2012); David S. Levine, Transparency Soup: The
ACTA Negotiating Process and "Black Box" Lawmaking, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 811
(2011); Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 1, at 998-1019.
72. For example, Senator Ron Wyden recently introduced an amendment to
the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act that would require the United States to
disclose documents "describing a position of, or proposal made by, the United States
with respect to intellectual property, the Internet, or entities that use the Internet,
including electronic commerce, not later than 24 hours after the document is shared
with other parties to negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement." 158
CONG. REC. S1798 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2012) (Senate Amendment 1869 to H.R. 3606 by
Sen. Wyden).
73. See Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 1, at 1007.
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disclose the draft TPP text.
Finally, the highly technical and trade-oriented nature of the TPP
negotiations may greatly reduce the interest of the public at large in the
negotiations.74 In fact, without the controversial issues surrounding the
Internet and digital communications technologies, one has to wonder
whether the TPP negotiations could find their way to the mainstream
media. The public at large is simply not interested in trade tariffs or trade
remedies. Even ACTA did not receive much coverage in the mainstream
media, notwithstanding the fact that it is mostly about intellectual property
protection and enforcement, as opposed to trade issues.71
In sum, TPP may not receive the same amount of public scrutiny as
ACTA. Without such scrutiny, the provisions from TPP are likely to favor
private rights holders more than they otherwise would have. From a public
interest standpoint, TPP, therefore, could be more dangerous than ACTA.
IV. SOPA/PIPA
Both ACTA and TPP focus on creating intellectual property
protection and enforcement standards at the international level. SOPA
and PIPA, by contrast, are domestic bills submitted to the U.S. Congress.
They seek to impose new obligations on Internet intermediaries to block
access to websites that facilitate online piracy and counterfeiting.76 SOPA
specifically focuses on four groups of intermediaries: Internet service
providers, search engines, payment networks, and advertising networks. 77
Because SOPA and PIPA implicate websites that are located abroad
or are accessed through domain names registered overseas, the potential
extraterritorial reach of the proposed legislation has sparked major
concern not only within the United States, but also in other parts of the
world. In a joint letter to U.S. policymakers, members of the European
Parliament remind them of "the need to protect the integrity of the global
internet and freedom of communication by refraining from unilateral
74. The legalese and technical nature of intellectual property issues was one
of the reasons why the public at large was not interested in these issues until recently.
See ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1 (2006),
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr06-gowers-report_755.pdf; SUSAN K.
SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 99 (2003).
75. See Yu, Complex Politics, supra note 10, at 13.
76. PIPA, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011); SOPA, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
77. SOPA, H.R. 3261.
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measures to revoke [Internet protocol] addresses or domain names. 78
On November 16, 2011, which was popularly christened as the
"American Censorship Day," Tumblr, Mozilla, Reddit, Techdirt, and other
companies staged a major protest on SOPA.79 Although this protest did
not receive much public attention, the public (and policymakers) began
paying greater attention following the service blackout launched by
Wikipedia, Reddit, WordPress, and other Internet companies two months
later.80 As Senator Ron Wyden reminded USTR Ronald Kirk in a recent
trade policy hearing of the Senate Finance Committee, "The norm changed
on Jan. 18, 2012, when millions and millions of Americans said we will not
accept being locked out of debates about Internet freedom." 8'
To be fair, SOPA and PIPA serve a very important goal-that is, to
protect the valuable intellectual property assets of American rights holders.
One could further argue that protecting intellectual property rights is
critical to the U.S. economy. 82 Nevertheless, the proposed bills are poorly
drafted, relying on flawed enforcement designs. Although this Part focuses
primarily on SOPA, most of its analysis is equally valid for PIPA or other
similar legislation.
In its current form, SOPA has at least five shortcomings. First, some
of the proposed correction measures are highly disproportional to the
wrong. As noted constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe observes:
78. Letter from Marietje Schaake, Member of the European Parliament, et
al., to Members of [the U.S.] Congress (Dec. 12, 2011), available at http://euletter-sopa-
pipa.tumblr.com/ (emphasis omitted).
79. Hayley Tsukayama & Cecilia Kang, SOPA Opposition Goes Viral,
WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sopa-
opposition-goes-viral/2011/11/22/gIQAZX7OmN story.html.
80. See Jonathan Weisman, In Fight Over Piracy Bills, New Economy Rises
Against Old, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2012/01/19/technology/web-protests-piracy-bill-and-2-key-senators-change-course.html
?_adxnnl=l&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=1338668900-679STGMFBV21ugDugDhtJnQ
QW.
81. Joseph J. Schatz, Technology Groups Worry About Trade Pact, CQ
TODAY ONLINE NEWS (Mar. 13, 2012, 11:47 PM), http://public.cq.com/docs/news/news-
000004045563.html?ref=corg.
82. See generally ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN. & U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES
IN Focus (2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/IP Report
_March_2012.pdf (discussing the importance of intellectual property to the U.S.
economy).
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[Under SOPA, c]onceivably, an entire website containing tens of
thousands of pages could be targeted if only a single page were
accused of infringement. Such an approach would create severe
practical problems for sites with substantial user-generated content,
such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, and for blogs that allow
users to post videos, photos, and other materials.83
Indeed, it is hard to explain why legitimate industries and Internet users
should pay the price-economically or technologically-when the online
community has some inevitable bad apples.
Second, U.S. Customs has already actively seized piratical and
counterfeiting websites, including those providing live streams of sporting
events. 84 The U.S. government has also initiated extradition proceedings
against massive infringers from abroad, including most recently Kim
Dotcom, the owner of Megaupload. 85 Successful, past extradition efforts
have even sent the Australian leader of the warez group DrinkOrDie, Hew
Raymond Griffiths, to jail in Virginia for fifteen months.86
Third, SOPA fails to take into consideration the many new
technological and business models that have become popular among
Internet users. Consider YouTube, for example. Displaying billions of
videos a day in more than fifty languages, 87 this service is exciting not
because it facilitates copyright infringement, but because it provides an
attractive platform for Internet users to locate legitimate content
83. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE "STOP ONLINE PIRACY ACT" (SOPA)
VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT 2 (2012), available at http://www.net-coalition.com
/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/tribe-legis-memo-on-SOPA-12-6-11-1.pdf.
84. See Chad Bray, Black Sunday: U.S. Attorney, ICE Seize Illegal Sports
Sites, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Feb. 2, 2012, 12:57 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/02
/02/black-sunday-us-attorney-ice-seize-illegal-sports-sites/ (reporting the seizure of "16
Web sites that provided access to illegal live streams of copyrighted sporting events"
before the Super Bowl).
85. See Ben Sisario, 7 Charged as F.B.I. Closes a Top File-Sharing Site, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2012, at Bi, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/O1/20/technology
/indictment-charges-megaupload-site-with-piracy.html?_rl&ref=bensisario (reporting
the seizure of the website Megaupload and the arrest of seven people connected with
its operation).
86. See Brian Corrigan, Long Arm of Copyright Law, FIN. REV. (July 6, 2011,
11:26 AM), http://www.afr.com/p/business/technology/long-arm-of-copyright-law
_KvHCTN8j10KV3Zj0FbdWPN.
87. See Statistics, YoUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/press-statistics (last
visited May 19, 2012).
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unavailable on the market.88
Unfortunately, SOPA does not appreciate the social benefits brought
about by these new websites and services. As the Center for Democracy
and Technology acknowledges, "The new de facto duty to track and
control user behavior [as required by the proposed legislation] would
significantly chill innovation in social media and undermine social websites'
central role in fostering free expression."8 9
Fourth, while SOPA would not "break the Internet"-as some have
claimed in exaggeration 0 it does inflict some serious collateral damage.
From erosion of free speech 9' to creation of cybersecurity concerns, 92 the
statute's benefits do not always compensate for its unintended harms. As
the U.S. Public Policy Council of the Association for Computing
Machinery points out in its analysis of SOPA:
88. See generally Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright and Confuzzling Rhetoric, 13
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 881, 897-99 (2011) (discussing the benefits of YouTube).
89. Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., The Stop Online Piracy Act: Summary,
Problems & Implications, http://cdt.org/files/pdfs/SOPA%202-pager%20final.pdf (last
visited May 13, 2012).
90. For example, the comedian Jon Stewart said SOPA would "break the
Internet," drawing on the catchy slogan widely used by the technology community. See
Late Night: Jon Stewart Says SOPA Would 'Break the Internet', L.A. TIMES (Jan. 19,
2012, 9:56 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/showtracker/2012/01/late-night-jon-
stewart-sopa-internet.html. Similarly, Mark Lemley, David Levine, and David Post
call on policymakers not to "break the Internet." See Mark Lemley et al., Don't Break
the Internet, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34 (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www
.stanfordlawreview.org/online/dont-break-internet. There is no doubt that legislation
such as SOPA and PIPA will change the way the Internet operates. However, as we
learn from the Chinese experience, the Internet does not break easily; it can
accommodate different types of regulation. Whether one finds the outcome appealing
is, of course, a very different question.
91. For contrasting views on SOPA's conflict with the First Amendment,
compare TRIBE, supra note 83, with Letter from Floyd Abrams, Partner, Cahill Gordon
& Reindel LLP, to Lamar Smith & John Conyers, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House
of Representatives (Nov. 7, 2011), available at http://www.mpaa.org/Resources
/1227ef12-e209-4edf-b8b8-bb4af768430c.pdf.
92. For discussions of the cybersecurity concerns raised by SOPA and PIPA,
see generally ACM [ASS'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY] U.S. PUB. POLICY COUNCIL,
ANALYSIS OF SOPA's IMPACT ON DNS AND DNSSEC (2012) [hereinafter USACM
SOPA ANALYSIS], available at http://usacm.acm.org/images/documents/DNSDNSSEC
.pdf; ACM, U.S. PUB. POLICY COUNCIL, ANALYSIS OF PIPA's IMPACT ON DNS AND
DNSSEC (2012), available at http://usacm.acm.org/images/documents/DNSDNSSEC-
Senate.pdf.
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[W]e do not believe that attempts to block or alter DNS [domain name
system] or DNSSEC [DNS Security Extensions] look-ups will be
particularly effective in stopping individuals who wish to connect to
criminal sites outside the U.S., and will be less effective over time for
all users. However, the costs and overhead associated with
maintaining blocks and responding to orders will remain.93
Finally, like ACTA, SOPA could provide repressive governments
with an internationally acceptable blueprint for developing Internet
censorship regulations. 94 The legislation "would ... set the dangerous
international precedent that governments seeking to block online content
that violates domestic law should look to online communications platforms
as points of control." 95  Should SOPA be adopted, it would indeed be
hypocritical for the U.S. government to complain about similar laws
enacted abroad.
Given the bill's many shortcomings, and the political complications
massive Internet protests will create in an election year, it is no surprise
that the Obama Administration was willing to distance itself from the
controversial legislation.96  The weekend before the massive Internet
service blackout in January 2012, the Administration released a carefully
drafted statement declaring that "it will not support legislation that reduces
freedom of expression, increases cybersecurity risk, or undermines the
dynamic, innovative global Internet. '' 97
Immediately following the blackout, several congressional members
also quickly withdrew their support for SOPA and PIPA.98  More
importantly, Representative Lamar Smith and Senator Harry Reid
announced the postponement of consideration of these bills, bowing to
93. USACM SOPA ANALYSIS, supra note 92, at 7.
94. See discussion supra Part II.
95. Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., supra note 89, at 2.
96. VICTORIA ESPINEL ET AL., COMBATING ONLINE PIRACY WHILE
PROTECTING AN OPEN AND INNOVATIVE INTERNET (2012), reprinted in Macon Phillips,
Obama Administration Responds to We the People Petitions on SOPA and Online
Piracy, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 14, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/01/14
/obama-administration-responds-we-people-petitions-sopa-and-online-piracy.
97. Id.
98. See Guy Adams, Is Wikipedia Winning the War? U.S. Senate Slips into
Reverse After Blackout Day, THE INDEP. (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk
/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/is-wikipedia-winning-the-war-us-senate-sips-into-
reverse-after-blackout-day-6292206.html.
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pressure from Internet companies and the user community. 99 In retrospect,
the developments concerning SOPA and PIPA may have shown us how to
mobilize individuals and communities to protest against international
agreements such as ACTA and TPP. 00
V. CONCLUSION
For the past few years, policymakers, with strong support from the
entertainment and pharmaceutical lobbies, have been cooking alphabet
soup in the legislative cauldron. Large and small, homemade or otherwise,
time-tested or experimental, a wide variety of alphabet pasta has been
added to this soup. While the pasta may look fun and attractive, and it
could even fill up one's stomach, strong evidence suggests that the fully
cooked soup will unlikely nourish society.
Although it is undeniably important to address intellectual property
piracy and counterfeiting, most of the proposed initiatives are badly
designed. The development of ACTA, TPP, SOPA, and PIPA is unlikely
to provide private rights holders with much-needed protection. Even
worse, such development may harm the public interest by violating due
process while at the same time stifling free speech, free press, and other
civil liberties.
It is high time policymakers start inquiring about what they are really
cooking in that legislative cauldron. It is also important that they explore
whether alternative ingredients can be used to prepare better enforcement
soup. After all, legislators have made election promises to carefully
deliberate over what gets served at our table. It is only fair that we hold
them accountable for what they cook.
99. Hayley Tsukayama, Action to be Postponed on House Bill Targeting
Online Piracy, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/economy/action-to-be-postponed-on-house-bill-targeting-online-piracy/2012/01/20
/gIQARqEvEQStory.html.
100. See Jonathan Band, The SOPA-TPP Nexus (Program on Info. Justice &
Intellectual Prop., Research Paper No. 2012-06, 2012), available at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/28/.
